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Pollution emissions and institutions quality nexus in Africa 
This paper tests the pollution emissions and institutions quality nexus in Africa, through 
political regime and governance indicators. We apply the system GMM estimator on a dynamic 
panel of 50 African countries over the period 1990-2014. The key finding suggests that a 
reinforcement of legislation through the improvement of institutional quality has a negative and 
significant effect on pollution emissions. Moreover, the findings validate the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve hypothesis in Africa. The results call for some policy recommendations in 
environmental regulation for African economies, including strengthening of institutional 
quality, adoption of specialized investment promotion agencies on the attractiveness of green 
FDI, implementation of incentive mechanisms in favour of companies that have adopted 
greening program of their activities. 
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1. Introduction 
The agreement reached at the climate change conference held in Paris (COP 21) at the end of 
2015 is historically unprecedented. It stresses the urgency for the countries of the world to set 
up actions to protect the environment. For example, it explicitly foresees limiting the increase 
in temperature below 2 degrees Celsius and even tending towards 1.5 degree. It is a flexible 
agreement, because it accounts for the needs and capacities of each country, with a periodic 
review of ambitions. More specifically, the agreement recommends progressive and gradual 
reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions across the world. Moreover, this agreement also 
shows that no real development plan can be conceived without integrating environmental 
concerns, reinforcing the problem of sustainable development, that is to say the need to 
reconcile economic development with environmental protection. 
In Africa, the situation is paradoxical. This continent contributes little to global pollution but 
suffers more than other continents from the multiple effects of environmental degradation. 
These effects are the results of the relocations of most polluting industries from industrialized 
countries to African countries, bringing about increase in water and air pollution. This article 
aims at testing the link between pollutant emissions and institutional quality in Africa, through 
the political regime and governance. 
According to data from the World Bank (WDI, 2018), the trend in global pollutant emissions 
has increased globally since 1960. They increased from 9 396 705.835 to 33 516 380 kilotonnes 
from 1960 to 2010, an increase of 256.68%. However, there is a disparity between regions. 
With regards to Africa specifically, two trends emerged. In North Africa, there has been a steady 
upward trend since the 1960s, which is considered as the least polluting, with 1.23 Metric ton 
per capita. From 1970 to 2000, the levels of polluting emissions range from 2.10 to 3.54 Metric 
ton per capita, representing an overall growth of 187.80%. In sub-Saharan Africa, the average 
pollutant emissions do not exceed 1 Metric ton per capita. Indeed, after a steady increase from 
0.65 to 1.02 Metric ton per capita between the 1960s and the 1980s, pollutant emissions then 
fell to stabilize at 0.83 Metric ton per capita in the 1990s and 2000s. 
A correlation analysis of pollutant emissions and openness in Africa leads to the identification 
of two groups of countries: (i) the first, composed of 10 countries, depicting a negative link 
between pollutant emissions and openness. These are countries in which liberal trade policies 
have not necessarily attracted polluting industries from the rest of the world, due to an 
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acceptable institutional quality (Botswana and South Africa), political instability (Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Congo and Angola), or a low endowment of natural resources (Madagascar, 
The Gambia, etc.); (ii) the second group with 36 countries shows the positive correlation 
between pollutant emissions and economic openness. The lowest correlations in this group are 
found in Equatorial Guinea (0.04), Côte-d'Ivoire (0.05) and Comoros (0.08); the highest are in 
Tunisia (0.90), Morocco (0.88) and the Seychelles (0.87). These results tend to suggest that the 
level of pollutant emissions can be a consequence of economic development, openness policy 
and institutions quality in most African countries. 
The fundamental contribution of this paper is in three levels: (i) it tests the hypothesis of the 
existence of an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) in Africa; (ii) it captures the effects of 
economic liberalization through economic openness and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows on the level of polluting emissions; (iii) it estimates the effect of the political regime 
and governance on the dynamics of polluting emissions in Africa. 
At the end of the empirical analysis, we arrived at two main results: a reinforcement of 
legislation through the improvement of institutional quality has a negative and significant effect 
on pollution emissions. Moreover, the findings validate the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
hypothesis in Africa, unlike the pollution haven hypothesis. 
Following this first section, which constitutes the introduction, the rest of the paper is organized 
into four additional sections. Section 2 highlights a selective literature review. Section 3 
addesses the empirical strategy. Section 4 analyzes the main findings. Section 5 highlights the 
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes with some recommendations. 
2. Selective literature review 
One of the fundamental debates on environmental pollution pits two rival schools of thought. 
For the post-keynesians, notably Oates and Baumol (1975), the consequences of free trade then 
result in a vicious circle favoring pollution. On the basis of a two-country model, of which one 
poor (P) applying a «weak » regulation and another rich (R), which applies a «strong » 
regulation, they show that the polluting industries are moving to the poor country: this refers to 
the environmental dumping hypothesis. On the other hand, according to the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson model, corporate relocation depends on the availability of production factors, but 
not on institutional laxity. For example, firms that specialize in products requiring a high level 
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of capital (or labor) will settle in countries that are strongly endowed with this factor. Thus one 
can have an opposite effect to that envisaged by Oates and Baumol (1975). 
Empirically, two main hypotheses are generally discussed, namely the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve hypothesis (Grossman and Krueger, 1995) and the pollution haven hypothesis (Suri and 
Chapman, 1998). The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis was tested for the first 
time by Grossman and Krueger (1995), who succeed in demonstrating that initially 
environmental quality deteriorates with increasing income. From a certain level of wealth, 
economic growth would be accompanied by an improvement in environmental quality, that is 
to say that society has the means and the will to reduce the level of pollution. Recent work on 
the existence of an EKC has led to controversial results. While some works validate its existence 
(Oh and Yun, 2014; Keene and Deller, 2015; Halicioglu and Ketenci, 2016), others find an 
ambiguous result (Aldy, 2005; Gassebner et al., 2011; Smulders et al., 2014). According to 
Abid (2017), empirical work on the Kuznets environmental curve establishes three types of 
results, namely favorable results, controversial results and nonsignificant results. For a 
complete critical theoretical and empirical literature review, refer to Stern (2004). 
As for the pollution haven hypothesis, it highlights the effect of the difference of the legislations 
on environmental degradation (Cole, 2004). Indeed, international trade is responsible, all things 
being equal, for environmental damages caused by relocations (Suri and Chapman, 1998) to 
countries with soft laws. This effect results from a pollution transfer from the industrialized 
countries to the developing countries. Recent works attempt to confirm this result with more 
robust and sophisticated empirical tools (Stern, 2004). Work on environmental degradation is 
also related to the population effect and institutional quality (Cole, 2007; Goel et al., 2013; 
Asumadu Sarkodie and Adams, 2018) factors that are retained in this article as determinants. 
The role of institutions in the development of modern economies is undeniable. Institutions 
define the development framework by modeling the behavior of individuals in the society, who 
are required to consider them as rules of the game (North, 1990), whether formal or informal 
(Acemoglu et al., 2005). Otherwise, institutions are questioned through the prism of their 
measurement and performance in several areas of the economy (Rodrik et al., 2005).  
Work on the role of institutions have on environment has led to various results. More generally, 
institutions play an important role in environmental performance (Nguyet Phan and Baird, 
2015; Daddi et al., 2016; Andersson, 2018). The results established by Bernauer and Koubi 
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(2009) show that the political institutions measured by the degree of democracy and the political 
system have an impact on environmental protection. Interesting results are also determined by 
isolating the effects of corruption and the informal economy (Goel et al., 2013), and the effects 
of regulatory quality (Gani, 2013). 
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1. The model 
This paper adapts an extension of the basic model of Grossman and Krueger (1995), which 
examines the relationship between the level of development and pollution indicators. In its 
canonical form, the model establishes an empirical and non-linear logarithmic relationship 
between a pollution indicator and GDP per capita and is specified as follows (Stern, 2004): 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑦) + 𝛾2(𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑦)2 + 𝜀                                                                                                    (1) 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙 is the indicator of environmental degradation (per capita), 𝑦 is the real per capita income 
and 𝜀 is a random nuisance term. Beyond the squared (𝑦2) term that captures the nonlinear 
relation between 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙 and 𝑦 (EKC hypothesis), Grossman and Krueger (1995) include a cubic 
term (𝑦3) for the purpose of testing N-shape EKC (Stern, 2004) or the "recoupling"effect, 
capturing the resumption (overlapping effect) of pollution with the increase in per capita income 
after a certain threshold. However, the cubic term is not taken into account because of the 
potential weak inverted U-relationship. This basic model can be improved through the inclusion 
of several variables depending on the objective, for example the use of resources that generate 
the production of waste (Stern, 2004). But the focus of this article is on the role of institutions. 
We capture institutions by two groups of variables, namely the political regime (𝑃𝑅) and the 
six governance indicators (𝐺𝑜𝑣) of the World Bank (𝐺𝑜𝑣1, …, 𝐺𝑜𝑣6). By adding these variables 
to the basic model, we obtain the following augmented form: 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑦) + 𝛾2(𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑦)2 + 𝛾3𝑃𝑅 + 𝛾4𝐺𝑜𝑣1 +⋯+ 𝛾9𝐺𝑜𝑣6 + 𝜀                            (2) 
Adopting a panel data specification, the estimated model is given as follows: 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾2(𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑡)2 + 𝛾3𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐺𝑜𝑣1𝑖𝑡 +⋯+ 𝛾9𝐺𝑜𝑣6𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (3) 
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3.2. Variables and data 
This article uses three types of variables (environmental, economic and institutional). The 
dependent variable is the log of Carbon dioxide emissions (CO2). The emissions related to CO2 
are those stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the manufacturing of cement. They 
include carbon dioxide produced during consumption of solid, liquid, gas fuels and gas flaring, 
respectively. 
The GDP per capita is the economic variable of our model. According to the World Bank (WDI, 
2018), GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is 
calculated as the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. The calculation 
supposes no deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation 
of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 US dollars. 
Institutional variables are considered as variables of interest in this paper. They are relative to 
the political regime (Polity2) and the six indicators of Kaufmann et al. (2010) of governance, 
namely Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. The 
variable Polity2 ranges from -10 (autocratic regime) to +10 (democratic regime), and the 
governance indicators are between -2.5 (very bad quality) and +2.5 (very good quality). We 
expect a negative sign for the coefficients associated with institutions. 
The data come from three main sources: World Development Indicators (WDI) for 
environmental and macroeconomic variables, Polity IV of the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) 
for the democratic regime and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) for governance 
indicators. The sample covers 50 (this number vary during the estimates depending on data 
availability in some countries) African countries over the period 1990-2014. 
3.3. Estimation technique and diagnostic tests 
Three main empirical critiques related to heteroskedasticity, simultaneity, omitted variables 
bias, and cointegration are addressed to the EKC hypothesis (Stern, 2004). However, most 
studies failed to prove the existence of heteroscedasticity (Cole et al., 1997; Holtz-Eakin and 
Selden, 1995). Moreover, the question of cointegration is not a matter of urgency since we use 
panel data. This paper uses the GMM estimator through a dynamic panel specification to 
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capture the lagged effect of the emission on its current level and to efficiently correct for the 
endogeneity bias. Indeed, one can suspect a bi-directional link between the level of emissions 
and the level of GDP per capita. In this context, we could suspect an endogeneity bias in the 
model (Stern, 2004; Cole, 2004; Lin and Liscow, 2013), which justifies our specification as a 
dynamic panel model. Indeed, in a dynamic panel model, the countries unobservable specific 
effects are correlated with the lagged dependent variable, which provides inconsistent 
estimators. Using the lagged values of the first difference of the endogenous variable as 
instruments, Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a consistent estimator, called the difference 
GMM estimator. However, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
demonstrated that when the dependent variable is persistent over time, lagged values are very 
poor instruments. Using additional conditions of moment, they proposed a more robust 
alternative estimator called system GMM estimator. 
Preliminary results from unit root tests (available on demand) open a way to the use of classical 
estimation methods, such as ordinary least squares on stacked or cross-section data, linear panel 
(fixed effects versus random effects). However, these methods remain silent with regard to 
accounting for the endogeneity bias that remains highly probable in the data generation process. 
For this reason, we choose the system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
4. Main findings 
Overall, the pollution level of the previous year has a positive and highly significant memory 
effect. Certeris paribus, on average the increase of one point in the previous level of emission 
increases the current level, ranging from 0.76 to 0.82 points. This result implies a vicious circle 
of pollution that is difficult to break (Table 1). 
The findings validate the existence of an EKC in Africa. In other words, the level of pollution 
tends to increase with the per capita wealth up to a certain threshold (inverted U-shape curve). 
The relationship remains robust except in the specification with the political regime (Polity2). 
Our results confim those obtained by Cole (2004) in OECD countries, Canas et al. (2003) in 16 
industrialised countries, Orubu and Omotor (2011) in 47 African countries, Ahmed and Long 
(2012) in Pakistan, Borhan et al. (2012) in Malaysia, Esteve and Tamarit (2012) in Spain, 
Shahbaz et al. (2013) in Romania, Kais and Sami (2016) in 58 countries, Saboori et al. (2016) 
in Malaysia, Zaman and Moemen (2017) in 90 countries, Sarkodie (2018) in 17 African 
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countries. Some studies have produced contrary results, in particular those of Focacci (2005) in 
Brazil, India and China, Jobert et al. (2012) in 55 countries, Kohler (2013) in South Africa, 
Heidari et al. (2015) in 5 ASEAN countries, Wang et al. (2016) in China, Ahmad et al. (2016) 
in India, Antonakakis et al. (2017) in 106 countries, Hu et al. (2018) in 25 developing countries. 
The findings related to institutional variables are mixed. If the level of polluting emissions is 
insensitive to the political regime, this is not the case for governance. Governance indicators 
remain globally significant and negatively associated (except VA) with CO2 emissions when 
they are individually integrated into the model. The results suggest that improving governance 
strengthens legislation, which would tend to limit the level of pollutant emissions. Otherwise, 
good governance strengthens institutions that support economic development and 
environmental protection. In order to capture an overall result, we generated a governance 
indicators (GOV), calculated as an arithmetic average of the six selected indicators.  
Table 1: Relationship between institutions and pollution in Africa  
  Dependant variable : CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita, in log) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lagged dep. var. 0.792*** 0.820*** 0.780*** 0.782*** 0.779*** 0.778*** 0.779*** 0.774*** 0.783*** 0.767*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0161) (0.0222) (0.0224) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0225) 
ln(GDPPC) 0.881*** 0.589 2.557*** 2.653*** 1.908** 2.625*** 2.579*** 2.256*** 2.442*** 2.0692** 
 (0.0555) (0.425) (0.782) (0.791) (0.791) (0.781) (0.787) (0.788) (0.780) (0.8364) 
ln(GDPPC)_square -0.015*** 0.000531 -0.110** -0.116** -0.0683 -0.115** -0.111** -0.0923* -0.103** -0.0776 
 (0.0030) (0.0270) (0.0482) (0.0487) (0.0490) (0.0481) (0.0484) (0.0486) (0.0480) (0.0518) 
Polity2  -0.00179         
  (0.00465)         
CC   -0.227***       -0.3106** 
   (0.0738)       (0.1310) 
GE    -0.173**      0.2135* 
    (0.0733)      (0.1252) 
PSAV/T     -0.106**     -0.0137 
     (0.0419)     (0.0521) 
RQ      -0.299***    -0.2739*** 
      (0.0725)    (0.0975) 
RL       -0.237***   -0.1305 
       (0.0836)   (0.1425) 
VA        0.0259  0.2429*** 
        (0.0644)  (0.0859) 
GOV         -0.256***  
         (0.0853)  
Constant -5.124 -3.924** -12.34*** -12.66*** -9.775*** -12.59*** -12.46*** -10.93*** -11.92*** -10.55*** 
 (0.2500) (1.633) (3.079) (3.118) (3.089) (3.069) (3.099) (3.098) (3.068) (3.2807) 
           
Turning point  $11 328.64 -- $11 179.78 $11 111.11 $11 464.84 $11 191.41 $11 254.75 $11 177.60 $11 250.00 $11 330.79 
           
Observations 1,119 836 732 730 731 731 731 731 732 730 
# of countries 49 40 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
AR1 (Prob z) 0.0282 0.0453 0.0560 0.0555 0.0556 0.0516 0.0581 0.0606 0.0555 0.0483 
AR2 (Prob z) 0.1268 0.3546 0.1569 0.1525 0.1700 0.1511 0.1607 0.1663 0.1589 0.1459 
Hansen Prob 0.3569 0.3664 0.3124 0.3898 0.40.25 0.3632 0.3987 0.2989 0.3458 0.3759 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
Note 1: VA: Voice and Accountability, PSAV/T: Political Stability and Absence of Violence / Terrorism, GE: Government Effectiveness, RQ: Regulatory 
Quality, RL: Rule of Law, CC: Control of Corruption 
Note 2: In order to have the values directly using the formula −𝛾1/2𝛾2 from equation (3), the turning points were calculated from a level specification. 
Source: Author. 
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The results show that CO2 emissions decrease with improvement in global governance. This 
general result confirms that obtained by Goel et al. (2013). Capturing the institutions by 
corruption and the shadow economy and considering them as endogeneous, Goel et al. (2013) 
showed that government effectiveness index is negatively and significantly associated with CO2 
emissions. In addition, Cole (2007) confirmed that polluting emissions are negatively 
associated with the level of corruption. In other words, good quality institutions would tend to 
reduce the level of polluting emissions. Similarly, in a study conducted in South Africa, 
Asumadu Sarkodie and Adams (2018) demonstrated that the depressive character of good 
political institutions on pollution is observed in the long run. 
Graph 1: GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita in Africa. 
  
  
 
 
Source: Author. 
From the econometric analysis, the turning point of per capita GDP beyond which 
environmental policies begin to exert a depressive effect on pollution is estimated at about 
11,000 US dollars per capita. These thresholds are obtained from a multivariate relationship 
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between the emissions of CO2 per capita (in level) and the GDP per capita (in level), each 
specification being controlled by an institutional dimension. According to a bivariate analysis, 
the relationship confirms the existence of an environmental Kuznets curve, despite the 
difference in the thresholds (see Graph 1), regardless of the indicator of per capita income 
(current, actual, PPP) or pollutant (CO2 per capita, sum of pollutants, total greenhouse gases 
emission per capita) used. However, the threshold appears to be reduced when we sum up many 
pollution indicators (CO2, methane and nitrous oxide) or we use the total greenhouse gases. 
This result reflects that considering several pollutants is more perceptible than the isolated 
effect of CO2. 
5. Robustness 
To ensure the validity of our results, we test their robustness. We adopt three approaches. 
Firstly, we use competing estimators for the system GMM estimator. Secondly, we check 
whether the results are overall sensitive to the other pollution indicators. Thirdly, we address 
some sub-regional membership specificities.  
5.1. Robustness checks with competing estimators 
The main estimation technique used in this paper is the system GMM estimator. However, as 
far as the endogeneity hypothesis could not be clearly proven, several other alternatives were 
used.  
Table 2: Robustness checks with competing estimators. 
 Dependent variable : CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) 
VARIABLES 
Pooled 
Least  
Squares 
(PLS) 
Static 
panel 
Fixed  
Effect 
Static 
panel 
Random 
Effects 
IV  
Fixed 
Effects 
IV  
Random 
Effects 
Diff 
GMM 
One step 
Diff 
GMM 
Two step 
Syst 
GMM 
Two step 
Lagged - - - - - 0.688*** 0.686*** 0.799*** 
      (0.0420) (0.0243) (0.0484) 
ln(GDPPC) 1.890*** 1.033*** 1.140*** 1.083*** 1.170*** 1.648*** 1.772*** 0.705*** 
 (0.241) (0.275) (0.266) (0.275) (0.266) (0.333) (0.141) (0.199) 
ln(GDPPC)_square -0.0478*** 0.00645 0.00192 0.00373 0.000290 -0.0908*** -0.1000*** -0.0312*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0179) (0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0174) (0.0217) (0.00995) (0.0112) 
CC 0.139* -0.0561 -0.0351 -0.0650 -0.0451 -0.0983 -0.0824*** -0.0762*** 
 (0.0747) (0.0513) (0.0508) (0.0511) (0.0507) (0.0616) (0.0110) (0.0122) 
GE 0.660*** -0.0595 -0.0299 -0.0538 -0.0248 -0.00524 -0.0296* -0.0182 
 (0.103) (0.0524) (0.0518) (0.0522) (0.0517) (0.0602) (0.0177) (0.0146) 
PSAV/T 0.0402 -0.0191 -0.0181 -0.0185 -0.0181 0.0325 0.0356*** -0.0294*** 
 (0.0386) (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0214) (0.0243) (0.00714) (0.00648) 
RQ -0.346*** 0.00650 -0.00704 0.00866 -0.00450 -0.0451 -0.0297** 0.0298** 
 (0.0831) (0.0454) (0.0451) (0.0452) (0.0449) (0.0511) (0.0119) (0.0149) 
RL -0.0707 0.0128 0.0170 -0.00937 -0.00351 0.0351 0.0511** 0.0539** 
 (0.111) (0.0613) (0.0611) (0.0616) (0.0614) (0.0647) (0.0232) (0.0264) 
VA -0.155*** 0.0413 0.0343 0.0405 0.0356 0.0187 -0.00230 0.0358* 
 (0.0529) (0.0381) (0.0376) (0.0379) (0.0375) (0.0444) (0.0177) (0.0195) 
Constant -11.72*** -8.707*** -9.204*** -8.932*** -9.352*** -7.358*** -7.739*** -3.565*** 
 (0.886) (1.058) (1.019) (1.057) (1.019) (1.302) (0.509) (0.896) 
Observations 730 730 730 728 728 552 552 730 
R-squared 0.855 0.530       
# of countries 48 48 48 47 47 47 47 48 
AR1 Prob      0.0644 0.8548 0.6964 
AR2 Prob      0.1481 0.7778 0.6270 
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Hansen Prob      0.2556 0.3635 0.4552 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author. 
These are: (i) pooled least squares (PLS), under the assumption that countries would be 
considered as homogeneous; (ii) static panel estimation (fixed effects and random effects), 
under the assumption that the lagged endogenous memory effect is negligible, in addition to 
that of the perfect homogeneity of the explanatory variables; (iii) instrumental variable (fixed 
effects and random effects) estimator, for controlling the specific endogeneity bias associated 
with the GDP per capita; (iv) difference GMM estimator, if the additional moment conditions 
required by the system GMM are irrelevant. The results (see Table 2) validate the existence of 
an EKC for PLS and for additional specifications of GMM. Once more, emissions remain 
insensitive to the political regime with all specifications. Some governance indicators remain 
negatively correlated with CO2 emissions in PLS and for additional specifications of GMM. 
5.2. Robustness checks with pollution indicators 
In this approach, we capture the specific effect related to other pollution variables in log and in 
level. They are methane1 (metric tons per capita in log), nitrous oxide2 - N2O (in log), and total 
greenhouse gas – GHG per capita (in level and in log). We use the system GMM estimator. 
Table 3: Robustness checks with pollution indicators. 
Dependent variables : Methane, Nitrous oxide, GHG per capita (in level) and GHG per capita (in log) 
VARIABLES Methane  Nitrous oxide GHG per capita (in level) 
GHG per capita 
(in log) 
Lagged 0.893*** 0.795*** 1.056*** 0.238*** 
 (0.00560) (0.0143) (0.000132) (0.00537) 
ln(GDPPC) -0.246*** 0.685** 0.00714*** 1.018*** 
 (0.0387) (0.273) (1.01e-05) (0.270) 
ln(GDPPC)_square 0.0171*** -0.0546*** -0.000504*** -0.0401** 
 (0.00241) (0.0183) (6.64e-07) (0.0172) 
CC -0.165*** -0.132*** 0.000777*** 0.0868*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0206) (8.15e-07) (0.0287) 
GE 0.0577*** 0.0135 -0.000197*** -0.0700 
 (0.0144) (0.0263) (1.01e-06) (0.0654) 
PSAV/T -0.0398*** -0.0746*** 0.000610*** -0.114*** 
 (0.00848) (0.0116) (6.14e-07) (0.0290) 
RQ -0.0276*** -0.154*** 6.18e-05*** -0.143*** 
 (0.00570) (0.0221) (3.03e-07) (0.0154) 
RL -0.0379* 0.0588* -0.000338*** -0.0246 
 (0.0205) (0.0310) (1.11e-06) (0.0273) 
VA 0.0297*** -0.0367** -0.000295*** -0.511*** 
 (0.00888) (0.0172) (2.18e-06) (0.0189) 
Constant 1.696*** -0.619 -0.0245*** -1.893* 
 (0.175) (0.977) (3.66e-05) (1.071) 
Observations 638 638 685 613 
# of countries 48 48 48 46 
AR1 Prob 0.0010 0.0006 0.1024 0.0476 
AR2 Prob 0.4080 0.9267 0.7220 0.0148 
Hansen Prob 0.5320 0.4950 0.5156 0.5987 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                          
1
 Methane emissions result from human activities such as agriculture and industrial production. 
2
 Nitrous oxide result from the burning of agricultural biomass, industrial activities and livestock management. 
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Source: Author 
The results (see Table 3) validate the existence of an EKC for nitrous oxide, and total GHG3 
(per capita and in log), but not for methane. In all these specifications, the more sensitive 
governance indicators to pollution are control of corruption, political stability and absence of 
violence, regulatory quality and rule of law. 
5.3. Robustness checks to sub-regional membership 
The third strategy of this robustness test focuses on subregional estimates, that is, the base 
model is specified for each subregion. The OLS estimator validates the existence of an EKC in 
Northern Africa and Southern Africa (Table 4). The political regime highlights a controversial 
result depending on sub regions and variables considered. 
Table 4: Robustness checks with subregional dummies 
Dependent variable : CO2 metric ton per capital (in log) 
 North Africa  West Africa  Central Africa  Southern Africa  Eastern Africa  
                
ln(GDPPC) 72.52*** 40.06**  10.03 -25.31  -29.06*** -26.92***  14.22 22.88*  -169.3 -113.6  
 (13.50) (19.47)  (12.66) (16.19)  (5.822) (6.796)  (8.679) (11.87)  (307.0) (251.6)  
ln(GDPPC)_square -8.533*** -4.572*  -1.225 4.031*  4.066*** 3.727***  -2.143* -3.120*  27.97 18.50  
 (1.673) (2.444)  (1.826) (2.374)  (0.788) (0.922)  (1.210) (1.657)  (45.71) (37.96)  
ln(GDPPC)_cube 0.338*** 0.177*  0.0559 -0.203*  -0.178*** -0.160***  0.116** 0.149*  -1.517 -0.984  
 (0.0688) (0.102)  (0.0874) (0.115)  (0.0347) (0.0411)  (0.0554) (0.0758)  (2.263) (1.906)  
Polity2 -0.026*** 0.00318  -0.0145 -0.0200  -0.054*** -0.055***  0.0544*** 0.0481***  -0.0220 -0.00598  
 (0.00887) (0.0116)  (0.0112) (0.0161)  (0.0138) (0.0162)  (0.0104) (0.0105)  (0.0191) (0.0273)  
Gov. Index -0.402***   -0.126*   0.0713   -1.12***   -0.314   
 (0.0896)   (0.0688)   (0.163)   (0.0760)   (0.252)   
CC  -0.109   0.239   0.523   -0.541**   0.102  
  (0.132)   (0.148)   (0.401)   (0.207)   (0.155)  
GE  -0.226   0.276   0.888**   0.859***   0.259  
  (0.143)   (0.185)   (0.409)   (0.285)   (0.282)  
PS  -0.0327   0.298***   -0.0147   -0.131   -0.159  
  (0.0992)   (0.0869)   (0.199)   (0.117)   (0.123)  
RQ  -0.111   -0.64***   -0.344   0.218   0.201  
  (0.104)   (0.155)   (0.335)   (0.193)   (0.303)  
RL  0.334***   -0.322   -0.656   -0.937***   0.208  
  (0.0861)   (0.217)   (0.490)   (0.161)   (0.338)  
VA  -0.31***   -0.161   -0.0125   -0.0800   -0.55***  
  (0.0995)   (0.184)   (0.348)   (0.208)   (0.170)  
Constant -206.3*** -118.0**  -30.34 48.27  62.65*** 58.46***  -35.82* -60.20**  333.2 225.2  
 (36.10) (51.53)  (29.13) (36.60)  (13.93) (16.28)  (20.34) (27.91)  (686.1) (555.1)  
                
Observations 67 67  180 179  112 112  84 84  56 56  
R-squared 0.976 0.983  0.713 0.760  0.957 0.961  0.975 0.989  0.700 0.895  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author 
In addition, the effect of the average index of governance is significant in Northern Africa, 
Western Africa and Southern Africa respectively. More precisely, (i) in Central Africa, only 
the political regime appear to reduce polluting emissions; (ii) in West Africa, it is RQ; (iii) in 
                                                          
3
 The main greenhouse gases (GHGs) naturally present in the atmosphere are water vapor (H2O), methane, carbon 
dioxide and nitrous oxide. The other GHG components are Dichlorodifluoromethane (CCl2F2), 
Chlorodifluoromethane (CHClF2), Tetrafluoromethane (CF4), and Sulfur Hexafluoride (SF6). They contribute to 
trapping the returned energy, increasing the average temperature of the Earth. Each GHG has a different effect on 
global warming. For example, over a 100-year period, one kilogram of methane has an impact on the greenhouse 
effect 25 times stronger than a kilogram of CO2. 
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northern and East Africa, it is voice acountability; (iv) in southern Africa, the rule of law and 
the control of corruption are hingering pollution significantly; These results show that some 
institutional dimensions play an important role in environmental protection in Africa. 
6. Concluding remarks 
This article tested the nexus between pollution and institutional quality, through political regime 
and governance indicators in Africa. We applied the system GMM estimator and many other 
competing estimators for robustness to a panel of 50 African countries over the period 1990-
2014. The study establishes the following key findings: 
 The EKC hypothesis is verified in Africa. In other words, the relationship between the 
level of emissions per capita and income per capita is non-linear in Africa. The level of 
development is accompanied by environmental degradation up to a certain threshold; 
 The institutional variables have mixed results. On the one hand, the findings suggest 
that the level of pollutant emissions is insensitive to the political regime in Africa. On 
the other hand, a significant reduction in polluting emissions is associated with an 
improvement in the quality of governance; 
 Overall, robustness tests validate the existence of an EKC and the depressive effect of 
good institutional quality on polluting emissions. The result suggests that the level of 
pollutant emissions in Africa does not necessarily depend on trade openness and FDI 
inflows, but on the existence of weak institutional quality. 
These results call for some policy recommendations in environmental regulation for African 
economies, including strengthening of institutional quality, adoption of specialized investment 
promotion agencies on the attractiveness of green FDI, implementation of incentive 
mechanisms in favour of companies that have adopted greening program on their activities. 
Lastly, in relation to the nature of the pollution indicators selected, the choice of a 
predominantly renewable energy mix should be promoted, and the transport system reformed. 
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Appendices 
Table A1: List of countries. 
South Africa Congo, D. R. Guinea Mauritania Seychelles 
Algeria Congo Equatoriale Guinea  Mozambique Sierra Leone 
Angola Côte d'Ivoire Guinea-Bissau Namibia Somalia 
Benin Djibouti Kenya Niger Soudan 
Botswana Egypt Lesotho Nigaria Tanzania 
Burkina Faso Erythrea Liberia Uganda Chad 
Burundi Ethiopia Libya Central African Republic  Togo 
Cabo Verde Gabon Madagascar Rwanda Tunisia 
Cameroon Gambia Malawi Sao Tomé-et-Principe Zambia 
Comores Ghana Mali Senegal Zimbabwe 
 
Table A2: Summary statistics. 
VARIABLES N Mean Standard  deviation Minimum  Maximum  
CO2_mt_pc 1,243 1.032 1.992 0.0107 10.04 
ln_CO2_ mt_pc 1,243 -1.164 1.485 -4.534 2.307 
CO2_kt 1,246 18,460 62,616 33.00 503,112 
CO2_kt_pc 1,247 0.00103 0.00199 0 0.0100 
ln_CO2_kt 1,246 7.649 1.907 3.497 13.13 
met_kt_eq_CO2 1,150 16,234 22,183 17.81 189,678 
ln_met_kt_eq_CO2 1,150 8.658 1.827 2.880 12.15 
nit_ox_thousands_mt_eq_CO2 1,150 9,602 16,898 6.202 172,723 
ln_ nit_ox_thousands_tm_eq_CO2 1,150 7.833 2.062 1.825 12.06 
Sum_Poll 1,250 42,169 81,417 82.64 590,903 
ln_Sum_Poll 1,250 9.362 1.812 4.415 13.29 
Sum_Poll_pc 1,247 0.00300 0.00474 3.02e-05 0.0750 
Tot_ghg 1,128 12,518 61,074 -34.87 503,112 
Tot_ghg_pc 1,175 0.000467 0.00165 -4.88e-05 0.00987 
ln_Tot_ghg 1,032 4.779 2.436 -4.605 13.13 
gdppc_2010 1,166 2,000 2,884 161.8 20,334 
ln_ gdppc_2010 1,166 6.965 1.042 5.087 9.920 
gdppc_curr 1,201 1,584 2,627 102.6 22,742 
ln_ gdppc_curr 1,201 6.630 1.114 4.631 10.03 
gdppc_ppp_2011 1,166 4,246 5,670 354.3 40,016 
ln_ gdppc_ppp_2011 1,166 7.808 0.966 5.870 10.60 
Polity2 938 0.200 5.205 -9 10 
CC 773 -0.655 0.595 -1.869 1.217 
GE 771 -0.768 0.606 -2.446 1.020 
PS 772 -0.537 0.922 -3.315 1.282 
RQ 772 -0.729 0.622 -2.645 0.804 
RL 772 -0.732 0.633 -2.606 1.044 
VA 772 -0.645 0.707 -2.226 0.970 
GOUV 773 -0.677 0.601 -2.449 0.880 
Source: Author. 
